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Abstract 
 
The paper considers the problem of subsistence and semi-subsistence farming in Central 
and Easter Europe. The latter is analysed in terms of the institutional characteristics of 
the transition process. The concepts of institutions and institutional change are clarified 
and subsistence agriculture is derived as a natural consequence from the process of 
economic transition. 
The process of shortening which gives rise to subsistence agriculture is described. It is 
demonstrated to have economy-wide effects, and in the domain of agriculture these 
effects lead the emergence of subsistence behavioural patterns. 
The  policy  implications  of  the  proposed  view  of  subsistence  agriculture  are  briefly 
reviewed and some policy recommendations derived.  
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Non-technical summary 
 
Agriculture in Central and Eastern European countries is characterised by considerable 
share of small-scale farming. This small-scale agriculture often consumes significant 
proportion of their own production. The latter constitutes the problem of subsistence 
agriculture.  Subsistence  agriculture  is  viewed  as  a  paradox  because  it  represents  a 
deviation from the principles of market economy. Moreover, since it is a characteristic 
of many developing countries, its presence in the countries in transition striving for 
accession to the EU is sometimes belittled and intentionally ignored. 
This paper analyses subsistence agriculture in terms of the institutional characteristics of 
the transition process. The basic concepts of institutions and institutional change are 
defined and this definition is different from much of the economic literature on the 
topic.  The  latter  provides  an  important  new  view  on  the  problem.  Consequently 
subsistence  agriculture  is  derived  as  a  natural  consequence  from  the  process  of 
economic transition. 
 
The analysis is developed around the introduced concept of shortening. The process of 
shortening is described and is demonstrated to give rise to subsistence agriculture. It is 
demonstrated to have economy-wide effects, and in the domain of agriculture these 
effects lead the emergence of subsistence behavioural patterns. 
The  policy  implications  of  the  proposed  view  of  subsistence  agriculture  are  briefly 
reviewed and some policy recommendations derived.  
   4
1. Introduction 
 
The existence of subsistence agriculture in transition economies is often perceived as a 
paradoxical outcome of economic reforms. Transition is an abbreviation for "transition 
from centrally planned to market economy". By definition it is a process of introducing 
the  principles  and  elements  of  the  market  into  former  communist  economies.  With 
regard to agriculture however, the process of transition led to the opposite result. The 
market simply disappeared. Moreover, subsistence agriculture does not just exist, it has 
emerged  and  expanded  during  transition.  It  seems  that  transition  has  created  and 
extended  current  subsistence  agriculture  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  The  puzzle 
becomes more complex, when one takes into consideration that small-scale household 
farms, now defined as subsistence, were in fact market oriented in the pre-transition 
period (Kornai, 1992). It seems that reforms and transition to the market succeeded in 
destroying one of the few elements of market of the previous economic system. This 
gives a different dimension to the problem of subsistence. Subsistence agriculture is not 
simply a logical outcome of the worsened economic situation in transition economies 
(Tho  Seeth  et  al.,  1998;  Caskie,  2000),  but  also  a  consequence  of  transition  as  a 
structural change.  We view the latter as an institutional change. The dangers of market 
liberalisation in the absence of strong institutions are now being recognised in Eastern 
Europe. We argue that subsistence agriculture in transition economies is a result of the 
dramatic institutional changes that took place in these countries during the last decade.  
Commercialising agriculture is undoubtedly a desideratum of agricultural policy. The 
process of commercialisation of the dualistic agriculture in transition countries is itself a 
further institutional change. This change cannot be successfully completed unless we 
properly understand the nature, driving forces, opportunities and threats that current 
subsistence agriculture in Central and Eastern Europe presents. To do this we must 
clarify the institutional foundations of the problem. 
   5
2. Institutions 
 
The term institution is widely and often misused. With regard to transition countries, the 
most often used meaning for institutional change include privatisation, legislation and 
organisational development. We argue that none of them are institutional change on its 
own. Institution is a rule or routine for behaviour. It can be illustrated as "if X, then do 
Y". Using such rules leads to patterns of similar recurrent economic behaviour in similar 
situations. To put it simply, institutions define economic behaviour. Contrary to the 
popular neo-classical view of institutions as restrictions in the maximisation problem, 
institutions  are  not  constraints  but  the  driving  force  of  economic  behaviour.  Neo-
classical orthodoxy assumes away the problem of economic action. It defines economic 
action as a maximisation problem which is entirely independent of the actions of the 
other economic agents. Since this is not the case however, the maximisation problem of 
a  given  economic  agent  should  include  similar  maximisation  problems  of  other 
economic  agents.    Since  these  are  also  dynamic  problems  maximisation  becomes 
logically  intractable.    Institutions  represent  stable  patterns  of  recurrent  economic 
behaviour  and,  as  such,  allow  the  individual  economic  agent  to  better  assess  the 
environment. In conditions of radical uncertainty and high complexity, rational utility 
maximisation is not feasible. Using behavioural rules helps to achieve an overall co-
ordination  pattern  through  the  formation  of  economic  roles.  Institutions  facilitate 
individual and organisational economic action because they make the actions of other 
economic agents more predictable. We note that existing institutions do not preclude 
deviations from the behavioural rules they prescribe. The latter implicitly includes in the 
economic  process  an  element  of  uncertainty  and  non-determinacy.  Economic 
development viewed through this lens of uncertainty becomes non-ergodic and path-
dependent process.  
In  a  stable  institutional  structure  however,  most  individuals  have  no  incentives  to 
deviate from the institutionalised rules of behaviour. This creates a greater degree of   6
predictability  of  economic  behaviour,  defined  by  the  stable  institutional  structure, 
although the latter should not be understood in absolute terms. 
Institutions can be defined as workable  (not necessarily efficient) adaptations to the 
environment.  As  such  they  represent  an  economy  of  calculative  efforts  and  are  a 
necessary pre-requisite for economic action. The market which is a major economic 
concept  is  itself  an  institution.  It  is  curious  that  although  this  is  probably  the  most 
widely used term in economics, there exists no comprehensive and acceptable definition 
of the market. Since the market is an institution, that is a set of behavioural rules and 
routines, that have evolved over time, it cannot be universal. The textbook notion of a 
market  is  an  abstraction  and  real  markets  need  to  be  studied  to  gain  a  better 
understanding  of  the  undergoing    economic  processes.  We  argue  in  this  paper  that 
subsistence agriculture itself is a market, integrated in the structure of other markets.  
Institutions as channels for economic action are organised in a hierarchical way. This is 
a consequence of the well known psychological finding that human perceptions and the 
related  categories  are  organised  hierarchically.  Since  the  way  we  see  the  world  is 
hierarchical (Simon, 1981), the way we act, and thus economic institutions should also 
be hierarchical (Langlois, 1986). Any complex set of behavioural rules, such as the 
market,  should  thus  be  defined  as  an  institution.  The  institutional  structure  of  an 
economy therefore consists of nested sets of institutions, which are mutually embedded 
and interdependent. We note that the countries of transition are often referred to as  
economies with missing institutions. This is false by definition. Institutions cannot be 
missing. They describe economic action. Doing nothing, because one does not know 
what to do, for example, is a rule of behaviour. Institutions are only defined as missing 
from  a  normative  or  comparative  point  of  view.  Both  these  are  inadmissible.  The 
normative point of view uses highly idealised concepts of market, perfect competition 
etc., in comparison with which any real situation will be imperfect. The comparative 
point  of  view,  on  the  other  hand,  ignores  the  basic  truth  that  institutions  are 
interdependent. Stating that some institution, present in country A is missing in country   7
B, is reductionist and misleading. The significance of the above can be considered only 
with regard to the comprehensive institutional structure of A and B. The institution that 
is 'missing' in B, may not be favourable in the conditions and the existing institutional 
arrangements in B, and its non-existence there may be a manifestation of economic 
efficiency. 
 
3. Institutional change 
 
The  process  of  institutional  change  is  best  understood  in  the  realm  of  interaction 
between  formal  and  informal  institutions.  The  main  difference  between  formal  and 
informal institutions is the question of their design. Formal ones have to be designed 
while informal ones are considered as the unintended consequence of human action. The 
design of formal institutions makes them convenient for analysis, since they are well 
defined, usually in written form. This explicit expression makes them suitable for formal 
analysis.  To  put  it  simply,  formal  institutions  are  easier  to  assess,  they  exist  in  a 
communicable form and are readily available to everyone. Informal institutions, on the 
other hand, are less tangible. They often contain a high proportion of "tacit knowledge" 
and  thus  are  much  more  difficult  to  analyse.  Due  to  this,  informal  institutions  are 
difficult to analyse on their own and it is not easy to predict their effects.  It follows 
therefore that the easiest thing is to ignore informal institutions and treat them in a neo-
classical fashion as constraints and solely concentrate on the formal institutions. The 
difference  between  formal  and  informal  institutions  and  the  widespread  use  of 
mathematical models in economics favours such an approach. This approach could be 
justified if formal institutions were the main determinants of economic activity while 
informal  ones  had  only  secondary  functions.    It  follows  then,  that  this  is  the  neo-
classical approach to institutional theory and, in general terms, is the stance of the New 
Institutional Economics.  It is therefore hardly surprising that Douglas North (1990), 
who explicitly states his aim as incorporating institutions into neo-classical economics,   8
ignores informal institutions and concentrates on the formal ones - "In term of the focus 
of this study a major role of informal constraints is to modify, supplement, or extend 
formal rules" (North, 1990, p. 87).  Even the language usage is expressive of the main 
idea, informal institutions are termed constraints, they do not merit the term institutions 
and analytical attention. The only role of informal rules in the above argument is to 
support the formal ones.  It is important to stress the consequences of adopting such an 
approach. In terms of institutional development, it suggests institutional engineering.  If 
formal  institutions  have  the  primary  role,  then  by  modifying  them  one  can  obtain 
desirable results.  It is true that North (1990) and other proponents of this approach 
explain in detail the "evolutionary" nature of institutional development. Nevertheless 
this does not change the main idea as being formal institution building.  It is thus hardly 
surprising  that  with  regard  to  recent  economic  transition  this  approach  has  been 
"propounded  by  those  -  generally  of  laissez-faire  leanings..."  (Dallago  and  Mittone, 
1996). This is the expression of the deterministic neo-classicism.  
This view of the primary role of formal institutions is however untenable.  Because "as 
Rousseau contended, it is in the end the law that is written in the hearts of the people 
that counts" (Riker, 1976, p. 13). This suggests the opposite idea of priority of informal 
institutions and complementarity of formal ones.  The absurdity of North's idea becomes 
greater taking into account his detailed "analysis" of the way Latin American countries 
adopted the principles of the American constitution (the formal rules) and the ensuing 
results.  Powelson  (1972)  provides  a  detailed  account  on  this  topic.  If  "informal 
constraints" were really so unimportant, how was this all possible? 
The opposite approach stresses the importance and leading role of informal institutions. 
Menger  (1963)  coined the terms organic for informal institutions and pragmatic for 
formal ones. He considered the approach of intentional design of formal institutions in 
order to influence the informal ones, as ahistorical.  If one finds the Austrian subjectivist 
approach  as    predetermining  this  opinion,  such  an  accusation  cannot  be  made  with 
regard to John Commons. It is useful to remember that Commons  deemed that  order   9
cannot result spontaneously but is always a consequence of application of power, which 
is the opposite to the Austrian standpoint.  And yet Commons says: "Custom ... may ... 
be even more mandatory than the decrees of a dictator" (Commons, 1931, p. 651). This 
highlights  the  importance  of  informal  institutions.  Institutional  "engineering"  is 
therefore unnecessary and harmful. The role of economic policy is not to provide the 
"rules of the game", but to select from the available set of rules.  This is explicitly stated 
in  Commons  (1934)  theory  of  institutional  change.  Even  when  purposefully 
orchestrated, institutional change will always have unintended consequences. Precisely 
predicting the change will only be possible if we are able to 'calculate' the complex 
interactions within the various institutions. Moreover, even if the latter was possible, the 
element of non-determinacy of institutional rules would make our task infeasible. There 
are limits to predictability in economics. In terms of institutional change, it is more 
difficult to 'control' the process, because institutional change is not simply change in the 
'rules of the game' but a change in the game itself. 
 
4. Transition and the raison d'être for subsistence agriculture 
 
4.1. An Institutional Framework of Transition  
 
Economic transition can be defined as a process of dramatic institutional change. The 
institutions  and  working  mechanisms  of  the  centrally  planned  economy  were  so 
different from those of the market economy, that transformation from the former into 
the  latter  requires  deep  behavioural  change  (Kornai,  1992).  A  common 
misunderstanding of the nature of transition is the persistent belief that this institutional 
change  was  designed.  Actually  the  political  and  economic  changes  only  altered  the 
economic environment. Since economic institutions represent workable adaptations of 
economic agents to this environment, the older institutions simply ceased to be useful in 
the radically new environment. In other words, by designed and implemented alteration   10
of  the  economic  environment,  conditions  were  created  for  institutional  change.  The 
driving force of the institutional change however is not the government, but purposive 
economic agents.  
Institutions have an information role. They provide rules and routines that are proven to 
work in given situations. Faced with uncertainty of the future, individuals are likely to 
confine their behaviour within these rules. Instability is a logical consequence of the 
destruction  of  the  old  established  institutions.  Rules  of  behaviour,  prescribed  by 
institutions  destroyed  in  transition  ceased  to  work.  This  dramatically  increased 
uncertainty.  This process is illustrated in Johnson et al. (1997) who emphasise the 
crucial role of the speed of the reforms. During this process of transformation, small 
scale agricultural production remained one of the few institutions that individuals could 
rely on. Household agriculture had to cope with the changed economic conditions and 
did this by becoming increasingly subsistence. 
Given  the  resulting  unstable  macroeconomic  situation,  households  faced a high risk 
environment. Their response to instability and uncertainty was to try to secure their 
basic food supply via subsistence production. Self-consumption can be considered a 
form of risk minimisation. Economic instability changes psychological attitudes and 
with the possibility of chronic food shortages, market stimuli lose their power. The 
dramatic macroeconomic changes promoted self-sufficiency as a high order household  
priority, and changed former relationships to the market.  It is important  to stress the 
asymmetric  nature  of  this  change.  The  short-term  reaction  to  macroeconomic 
disturbances  became  institutionalised  in  terms  of  behaviour  and  began  a  long-term 
attitude. 
Since at the aggregate level, institutions provide the "means of orientation" (Lachmann, 
1971), their change impacts on the behaviour and the attitudes of economic agents. The 
process  of  institutional  change  necessarily  brings  instability  in  observed  economic 
behaviour and creates uncertainty. There are two main sources of this instability related 
to economic transition. The first is the impossibility to follow the rules and routines,   11
contained in the destroyed institutions, because of the changed environment. This is 
often described as a "vacuum" borne by the destruction of old structures and the lack of 
functioning new ones.  The second, arguably more important source of instability, is  
related to the informational role of institutions. Hayek (1973) argues that outside the 
price  system,  patterns  of  routine  behaviour  transfer  information.  Except  for  the 
restrictions  that  they  impose  on  individual  behaviour,  institutions  are  considered  to 
convey knowledge. 
 
4.2 The process of shortening of production in real time 
 
An  important  characteristic  of  the  centrally  planned  economy  is  the  ideological 
emphasis on industrial development expressed in policies of "forced growth" (Kornai, 
1980,  1992).  Investment  in  agriculture  was  not  a  priority  in  this  situation.  The 
unavailability of credit leads to reallocation of resources from earlier to later stages of 
production. Liberalisation created conditions for deepening of the decapitalisation of 
agricultural  production.  This  process  of  reallocation  of  production  resources  during 
transition has been termed the shortening of production in real time (Kostov, 2002) and 
drives total agriculture towards subsistence type of behaviour. 
The uncertainty and instability generated by the initial reforms increased the importance 
of present relative to future consumption.  There is a direct link between the shortening 
and the propensity to consume. The shortening process effectively emphasises the later 
stages of production, the net effect of which is a relative increase in current relative to 
future consumption. Therefore this process takes place when there are expectations of a 
future fall in consumption of final products.  
The  process  of  shortening  however  cannot  be  properly  understood  in  terms  of  this 
restructuring  of  production  resources.  It  is  a  self-enhancing  process  in  which 
institutional instability plays a crucial role. It is a multidimensional process. One of its 
channels  is  the  effects  of  the  transaction  balances.  Since  transaction  balances  and    12
"short-lived"  capital  goods  are  complements,  whilst  transaction  balances  and  "long-
lived" capital goods are substitutes (Kessel and Alchian, 1962), the enlarged chance of 
economic errors leads to a substitution away from long-term capital. This is equivalent 
to transferring resources from the earlier stages of production (generally associated with 
long-term capital) to later ones. 
Inflation also contributes to the process. Inflation increases the preferability of current 
relative to future consumption of goods such as food, and therefore contributes to the 
shortening of agricultural production. In terms of agriculture, the above process means a 
need for current food and due to an expected future decline in food production, the 
danger  of  future  food  shortages.  Both  the  above  processes  give  rise  to  a  tendency 
towards  self-sufficiency.  This  tendency,  however  may  be  expected  to  be  relatively 
temporary, subject to the development of the new market institutions. 
The effect of shortening can alternatively be defined as diminishing the roundaboutness 
of production, that is by substitution of less roundabout production techniques for more 
roundabout ones. By using the term  roundaboutness we do not want to invoke the 
Bohm-Bawerk’s  formulation  of  theory  of  roundabout  production  which  refers 
specifically to the production of capital or other intermediate goods used in production. 
Here we view roundaboutness in a broader framework, without reference to whom and 
where these intermediate goods are being produced, but only being interested in their 
final  application in the production process. This treatment follows Kostov (2002) and is 
similar to the neo-institutional argument about asset specificity. 
With regard to subsistence and commercial agriculture, more roundabout production 
techniques  are  deemed  superior  than  the  less  roundabout  ones.  The  effects  of  the 
shortening  process  lead  to  agricultural  decommercialisation,  that  is  emergence  and 
development of subsistence agriculture. It may seem that this is unrelated to whether 
one produces for the market or for own consumption. The decreased roundaboutness of 
agricultural production however represents a regressive technical change that further 
shortens the time horizons and thus enhances the effects of institutional instability.  It is   13
itself, in the lines of our understanding, an institutional change, because it alters the way  
farmers produce and consume agricultural products. 
The  relative  preference  of  current  to  future  consumption  and  the  shortening  of 
production  in  real  time  lead  to  a  relative  decrease  in  both  future  production  and 
consumption. The decrease in roundaboutness of the production yields the same results. 
Subsistence behaviour, therefore, can be regarded as an insurance against the expected 
fall in consumption.  Kostov and Lingard (2000) and Kostov (2002) argue that the 
aggregate effects of subsistence are in maintaining consumption at a higher level than 
otherwise would be, thus offsetting some of the consumption effects of the decreased 
roundaboutness of agricultural production. In other words subsistence represents the 
reaction of total agriculture to the process of shortening. Shortening, it should be noted, 
is a global process that impacts on total agriculture and on the economy as a whole.  Its 
impacts on the different economic actors, however are different.  Small-scale agriculture 
is more susceptible in conditions of shortening to become subsistence. The effects of 
shortening on larger commercial farms may alternatively be expressed in restriction of 
their productive activity and may drive them out of business. The nature of the effects is 
also a matter of intensity of the shortening process. It would be useful to illustrate the 
latter  with  an  example.  Kostov  and  Lingard  (2002)  report  survey  results  about  the 
degree of commercialisation of Bulgarian farm units. It appears that most medium sized 
co-operatives and about half of the small private farming companies are subsistence 
production  units.  This  shows  that,  depending  on  the  intensity  of  the  process  of 
shortening, larger production units may be driven to subsistence behaviour. 
 
4.3 Institutional characteristics of shortening 
 
The above discussion stressed shortening, representing a process of production resource 
re-allocation.  What however is the meaning of "real time". It is clear that the process of 
shortening  cannot  be  interpreted  in  the  context  of  calendar  time.  In  the  case  of   14
agricultural production it takes the same amount of calendar time.  That is why we 
define the process of shortening using the subjective concept of real time.  Real time is 
understood  as  a  flow  of  events.  One  of  the  main  differences  between  real  and 
Newtonian  concepts  of  time  is  that  the  former  allows  for  novelty  and  surprises. 
Moreover time is identified with this element of surprise. When we say shortening in 
real time, however, we do not mean that the number of unexpected events during the 
process of production will be lower (Kostov, 2002). One can conclude that normally the 
opposite will be the case. The term "shortening" reflects that events that would affect 
typical features of the economic behaviour are less likely to occur. In other words  the 
process of shortening increases the role of the rule following behaviour by  lowering the 
subjective  probability  of  deviating  from  adopted  rules.  To  put  it  simply,  shortening 
increases the importance of institutions. Here is the paradox of shortening. It requires 
working institutions but in transition these are absent. Establishing new institutions is 
the outcome of a learning process that includes entrepreneurship. The latter however is 
impeded by effects of the shortening process. In other words the process of shortening 
may become a vicious circle.  This is more likely in agriculture than in other sectors of 
the economy.  The emergence of subsistence agriculture is a compensatory outcome of 
the  process  of  shortening.  Subsistence  is  an  institutional  solution  for  problems  of 
shortening. Without subsistence the process of shortening cannot continue. It should 
stop at some point, otherwise the productive system will be destroyed and, in its turn, 
will  effectively  stop  shortening.  In  agriculture  however,  the  possibility  to  directly 
consume produced food creates subsistence, which extends the effects of shortening by 
temporarily resolving the conflict. Subsistence agriculture is the institution that sustains 
the process of shortening of production in real time.  This character of subsistence is 
enhanced  by  the  'institutionalisation'  of  attitudes  and perceptions, resulting from the 
ongoing process of shortening. The latter leads to a stable state, which expresses what 
Kostov and Lingard (2000) termed the 'market clearing role' of subsistence, that is its 
tendency towards a suboptimal equilibrium. This 'market clearing role is expressed in   15
the  introduced  by  subsistence  agriculture  relative  productive  efficiency  losses  and 
additional  food  consumption  which  taken  together  decrease  the  possibility  of  a 
production surplus and thus lead to a more stable market. The market with subsistence is 
more stable and, in the short term, Pareto dominates the case of a totally commercial 
agriculture.    The  suboptimality  of  subsistence  effects  follows  from  a  dynamic 
perspective,  taking  into  account  its  impeding  effects  on  further  agricultural 
developments. 
 
5. The nature of subsistence agriculture in transition economies 
 
Understanding subsistence agriculture as an adaptive reaction to the dynamic effects of 
shortening  is an important step towards a clearer view of its role and place in the 
process  of  transition.  Subsistence  can  no  longer  be  deemed  an  unimportant  and 
temporary  phenomenon,  neither  can  it  be  seen  as  an  expression  of  economic 
irrationality.  In accordance with the new economic paradigm of subsistence agriculture 
which "draws attention to the linkages across markets and adaptive behaviour by rural 
decision  makers  that  often  compensate  for  the  apparent  efficiency  losses  caused  by 
market  failures"  (Timmer,  1997:  621),  it  is  viewed  as  a  complementing  market 
mechanism, that corrects some market failures. This alternative approach conveys the 
view  of  subsistence  as  a  market  institution  (Kostov,  2002)  which  increases  the 
adaptability  of  overall  agriculture  to  the  environment  (Kostov  and  Lingard,  2000). 
Consequently, "efficiency" considerations in implementing government policies that fail 
to take this into account, may lead to perverse results (Hoff et al., 1993). Neo-classical 
household  production  models  assume  separability  of  production  and  consumption 
decisions. This only holds for commercial farms not for subsistence ones. The process 
of agricultural decommercialisation implies a gradual shift to a separation of production 
and marketing choices which reflects an anchoring household production to household 
consumption. The effect of the process of shortening is towards temporal separation of   16
these choices. Mishev and Kostov (2001) utilise a mental accounting methodology to 
deduce this for Bulgarian subsistence farming.  We can demonstrate that this separation 
is  needed  for  maintaining  stability  at  the  aggregate  level  and  thus  expresses  one 
institutional characteristic of subsistence agriculture.  The process of shortening takes 
place  in  an  extremely  volatile  economic  environment,  characterised  by  high 
environmental entropy. Any system within this environment can be stable only if it 
exhibits low behavioural entropy (Heiner, 1983). To put it simply, the latter means that 
shortening  restricts enterpreneurship which is a high entropy type of behaviour and 
emphasises the importance of institutions. The informational role of institutions aimed 
at  reducing    uncertainty  can  alternatively  be  expressed  as  reducing  environmental 
entropy via the establishment of economic roles. Subsistence economic behaviour is 
characterised by a lower behavioural entropy than commercial.  This is partly due to the 
separation of production and marketing functions which insulates subsistence farming 
from market risks. Shortening therefore leads to augmentation of the relative importance 
of the subsistence component of total agriculture.  
The emergence of subsistence agriculture in transition countries should be explicitly 
related  to  the  market  orientation  of  small-scale  agricultural  producers  in  the  pre-
transition period (Kornai, 1992). The separation of production from marketing choices 
reflects the inability of current subsistence farmers to correctly "guess" volatile market 
fluctuations.  The  initial  step  in  this  separation  is  a  strategy  of  waiting  in  which 
marketing decisions are simply postponed. The failure to sell all the available market 
surplus in later periods however, impacts on the production potential of subsistence 
farms causing them to further withdraw from participation in the markets for inputs. We 
stress that subsistence agriculture in transition countries is an institution. Moreover, it is 
a crucial market institution, that makes the functioning of incomplete and imperfect  
agricultural  markets  possible.  In  other  words,  subsistence  agriculture  is  not  an 
alternative to the market, it is rather the market itself. This understanding of subsistence 
agriculture would require us to have a more holistic view of transition processes. Such a   17
view may incorporate the role of social capital in overcoming the burdens of transition 
and the role of subsistence agricultural production in  the societal safety nets. It would 
also require a better definition of what we define as ‘subsistence’. Does it include non-
market transfers based on links of kinship and friendship? These and other important 
questions are unfortunately beyond the scope of the present preliminary in many regards 
study. 
 
6. Breaking the vicious circle 
 
For a fuller understanding of the dynamics of subsistence it is useful to consider how the 
vicious  cycle  of  shortening  can  be  broken.  The  key  variable  is  the  propensity  to 
consume  which  can  decrease  given  lower  uncertainty.  Obtaining  general  economic 
stability  is  already  an  institutional  change  since  it  implies  qualitatively  different 
economic behaviour. It should be noted that uncertainty cannot be properly captured by 
macroeconomic  variables,  because  we  are  referring  to  a  mainly  micro-economic 
phenomena. An example of the trade-off between macro and microeconomic stability is 
the case of income compensation policies pursued in transition countries, particularly in 
the earlier years of transition. These aimed at restricting income compensation below 
the level of inflation in order to achieve macroeconomic stabilisation. The ensuing fall 
in  real  incomes  however  created  instability  at  the  micro  level  impacting  on  the 
propensity to consume and on the composition of consumer demand.  Bridging  and 
complementing  the  levels  of  uncertainty  at  macro  and  micro  level  is  a  challenging 
problem that needs further study. 
Reversing  the  process  of  shortening  however  also  requires  "sacrifice"  of  current 
consumption  to  increase  the  roundaboutness.    Such  a  "sacrifice"  is  only  feasible  if 
accompanied  by  expectations  of  a  future  rise  in  consumption.  By  consumption  we 
include  both  domestic  and  external  demand  for  final  products.  The  existence  of 
subsistence agriculture changes this proposition. The immediate response of subsistence   18
farms to changed demand would be more flexible than that of commercial farms. What 
they do is simply reallocate part of their own consumption to the market to adjust to 
unexpected changes in demand. In principle such reallocation would represent a shift in 
the propensity to consume if higher demand is expected. In a world of uncertainty and 
ignorance however, expectations have to be formed. With regard to this, the immediate 
reaction  of  subsistence  agriculture  to  changes  in  production  would  not  necessarily 
involve expectational elements. If the new higher demand stays at this level sufficiently 
long,  the  temporary  character  of  the  change  in  the  propensity  to  consume  may  be 
obliterated  and  therefore  "sacrificed"  current  consumption  may  lead  to  increased 
roundaboutness. The latter is a process that is  developing in time. The process takes 
time,  but  also  time  is  a  crucial  factor  in  its  dynamics  and  therefore  the  process  is 
necessarily non-ergodic and path-dependent.  
Therefore  subsistence  agriculture  could  contribute  to  the  formation  of  expectations 
which is a pre-requisite for agricultural commercialisation. The latter is a logical result 
of  the  nature  of  subsistence  agriculture  as  a  market  institution.  It  is  nevertheless 
important to stress that we see the role of subsistence as complementary in forming 
expectations. To put it simply, subsistence agriculture could contribute to the formation 
of expectations by saving time, but is not to be seen as a main driving force in the latter 
process. 
Once  the  expectations  for  higher  demand  are  realised,  the  roundaboutness  of 
agricultural production should increase to meet this higher demand. The possibilities of 
subsistence agriculture with backward technologies are limited and beyond some point 
this would become an impediment for agricultural development. The possibilities for 
technological  advances  are  much  greater  in  commercial  agriculture.  Even  in  the 
commercial  sector  however,  this  is  constrained  by  institutionally  defined  limits  to 
capital accumulation. Kostov (2001) argues that the process of capital accumulation 
needed for increasing roundaboutness of agricultural production represents a process of 
intertemporal substitution of different types of specific capital. The realisation of this   19
process is dependent on stability in the areas of prime use of the assets and institutional 
constraints  on  their  substitutability.  Mishev  and  Kostov (2001) demonstrate that the 
forces shaping subsistence agriculture contribute to its "closure" in the sense that it 
becomes  segregated  from  other  sectors  and  thus  impedes  processes  of  capital 
accumulation. 
 
7. Policy implications 
 
Policies aimed at general economic development and creating income opportunities will 
in general exercise favourable effects on agricultural commercialisation. They alter the 
environment  in  which  subsistence  farmers  operate  and  would  make  them  adapt  by 
changing their economic behaviour. Measures promoting market opportunities such as 
export stimuli could also contribute to this process.  
We  would  however  stress  the  dangers  of  direct  government  measures  designed  to 
abolish subsistence practices. We have argued that subsistence agriculture complements 
the  underdeveloped  market  in  transition  countries.  Trying  to  decrease  subsistence 
agriculture by administrative measures means reducing the market. This is the meaning 
of institutional engineering discussed at the beginning of this paper. These dangers need 
to be emphasised because this is current practice and the way of thinking of policy 
makers  and  academics  in  transition  countries.  Expressions  such  as  "to  get  the 
institutions  right"  and  numerous  analyses  of  the  legal  framework  and  other  formal 
institutions demonstrate this.  Formal institutions are easier to change. Institutions in a 
given society are however interrelated. They complement each other and are basically 
devices for identification and resolution of existing conflicts. Their complementarity 
and hierarchical structure facilitate this. Within the institutional structure, informal rules 
are the result of an ongoing evolutionary process shaped by formal rules and historic 
precedents.  Introducing formal rules that contradict the existing informal institutions 
violates the coherence of the overall institutional structure. Instead of solving conflicts,   20
this  generates  new  conflicts  and  increases  uncertainty.  The  implicit  assumption  of 
supporters  of  institutional  engineering  seems  to  be  that  informal  rules  would  adapt 
successfully and promptly to the formal institutions. Such an assumption is however 
unjustified.  In  practice  it  is  much  easier  to  adapt  formal  rules  to  existing  informal 
institutions. Commons (1931, 1934) supports the latter, viewing it as a 'normal' practice 
in institutional evolution.   
We are concerned here with other effects of the choice of institutional development. 
Pejovich  (1996)  gives  an  example  of  a  conference  at  which  a  representative  of  the 
former  Soviet  Union  remarked  that  the  former  supporters  of  central  planning  are 
nowadays  the  most  ardent  partisans  of  exogenously  driven  institutional  change. 
Institutional change is an outcome of the learning processes in the economy. Transition 
from central planning to market alters the environment and behavioural rules. Learning 
is  no  longer  possible  using  old  rules  and  routines.  They  have  to  be  unlearned. 
Institutional engineering, that is exogenously imposed institutional change, preserves 
behavioural routines that are harmful for this process. They preserve the old command 
style  of  economic  governance.  They  create  an  illusion  about  the  possibility  to  plan 
institutional change. If we can plan institutional change, then we can effectively plan the 
economy.  In  other  words  the  idea  of  planned  institutional  change  preserves  the 
governance structures of  central planning and therefore imitates change. Instead of 
creating possibilities for a "market" for institutions,  this type of policy is a substitute for 
the market.  It is clear that the informal institutional structure compatible with this type 
of policy is much closer to a centrally planned economy. In this case the new "planned" 
institutions are unable to identify conflicts between market principles and conducted 
policies. Therefore the resulting institutional structure is inefficient.  
It is important to stress that we do not argue against introduction of market related 
legislation and other formal institutional changes. They are needed as conflict resolving 
devices. Nevertheless the way in which these changes are carried out and the way in 
which they are viewed is important for institutional development. As Commons puts it,   21
institutions  are  not  only  "collective  action  in  control  of  individual  action",  but  also 
'"collective opinion in control of individual opinion". The latter is an informal institution 
because  it  defines  behaviour.  Academic  research  is  an  important  instrument  for 
changing prevailing opinions and guaranteeing more efficient institutions.   22
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